. The series for actual revenue and expenditure changes are compiled from Congressional Budget Office (CBO) publications, and are weighted averages of the legislated changes during the period covering the fiscal year in which the changes were enacted plus the following four fiscal years. The predicted series come from simple linear models based on the same specification I have used in previous papers, beginning with Auerbach (2002) , explaining the actual series with the beginning of period average (using the same weights) CBO forecast of the current and subsequent four years' projected budget surpluses and the most recent quarter's output gap.
1 The figure also presents out-of-sample predicted values of revenue and expenditure changes for winter, 2009, the current period as of this writing, for which the explanatory variables are already available.
The estimates themselves, given in Table 1 , show that both revenue and expenditure polices have been countercyclical and budget-stabilizing, with larger responses on the expenditure side. But, as the figure shows, policy volatility has varied over time, with a very quiet period during the mid-1990s sandwiched in between more active periods before and after. As discussed in Auerbach (2008) , the reduced activity during the 1990s is to some extent explained simply by the equation itself, with the lack of a recession weakening the case for intervention and the transition from budget deficits to surpluses pushing toward pro-deficit policies only toward the end of the decade. Budget rules -or perhaps the sentiment that led to their adoption, for the rules themselves are endogenous with respect to the budget process -also seemed to play a role in the changing patterns of policy responses, helping to explain the existence of procyclical policy interventions during the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings period of fixed deficit targets in the late 1980s and a more restrained stance while the Budget Enforcement Act was in effect during the 1990s; for example, one may note in Figure 1 the lack of significant tax cuts during the late 1990s even with the full-sample equation predicting tax cuts. Indeed, coefficient estimates of the equations in Table 1 for separate sample periods are all larger in absolute value for the post-BEA period than for the BEA period itself, especially the GDP gap coefficients associated with countercyclical policy (Auerbach 2008 ).
Thus, whether because of changes in budget rules or changes in other factors as yet unexplored, the stage was already set for policy decisions during the current recession, although even the equations based on the post-BEA period do not come close to forecasting the magnitude of the fiscal policies now being formulated.
I. Explaining the New Activism
Budget rules aside, what other potential explanations might exist for the renewed use of discretionary fiscal policy? One is that the strength of automatic stabilizers has been weakened over time by the indexation of the individual income tax and reductions in marginal tax rates. 40 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Conditioned by the growing recent use of countercyclical fiscal policy and facing a very significant recession in which monetary policy confronts unusual challenges, we are about to adopt an unprecedented peacetime fiscal stimulus. It is useful to ask at this juncture how well our fiscal plans align with the lessons of economic theory and evidence -whether our fiscal ideas are as "shovel-ready" as some of the projects we will be funding. Given space constraints, I will focus on one important issue, the design of investment incentives.
II. Investment Incentives and Stabilization Policy
Business fixed investment is volatile and forward-looking. The former characteristic makes investment an obvious target for stabilization policy while the latter characteristic suggests the need for caution in adopting any such policy. The fifteen years after TRA saw no significant changes in the tax provisions affecting corporate investment, as depreciation schedules remained fixed, the investment tax credit repeal held, and the corporate tax rate 6 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 The table suggests that government policy changes can be predicted to a considerable extent. In the figure, two patterns are noticeable. First, even without strong fundamentals pushing for a change in policy, the 1986-2001 period is still striking for its lack of any changes.
Second, the years since have seen stronger reasons for policy changes and but also changes that 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year Losses/Income
There are two approaches to dealing with this situation. One is to adapt corporate tax rules to make them more symmetric with respect to the treatment of tax losses, such as through refundability, which also would make the corporate tax function better as an automatic stabilizer.
Another is to adapt investment incentives themselves, such as through the adoption of schemes that allow for the transfer of the tax benefits associated with the incentive provisions. One such scheme, based on the formal structure of leasing, was introduced in 1981 in conjunction with ERTA's accelerated depreciation provisions. This scheme had problems of its own 3 , but no further mechanism of addressing the issue has been attempted in the many years since.
Finally, it is somewhat surprising that, even as temporary investment incentives have come into favor as a way of influencing the timing of business purchases, no such provisions have appeared in the design of household tax rebates, which basically have functioned as lumpsum transfers and have been criticized as being ill-suited to stimulate demand because of their temporary nature and hence small income effects. Why such household tax cuts have not been constructed in a way that would influence the timing of household decisions, as through a temporary reduction in consumption taxes 4 , is not clear, except perhaps that such reductions
were not contemplated or used in the earlier epoch of activist policy.
III. Conclusions
The current recession provides compelling circumstances for renewed fiscal policy activism. But the strong support for fiscal policy intervention reflects a renewed belief in policy activism that had already appeared before the present crisis. As the preceding discussion of investment incentives suggests, though, we are still relying on the approaches to discretionary policy used in past periods of policy activism. It is not surprising that there have been few advances in discretionary policy design, given the lack of favor such policy suffered over many years. But if we are going to practice fiscal discretionary policy on a large scale, then more attention to policy design is sorely needed.
